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UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES: 
LEGITIMATE WEAPON SYSTEMS OR 
UNLAWFUL ANGELS OF DEATH? 
 Michael J. Deegan*  
 
ABSTRACT 
SINCE THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, the United States 
has utilized Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to locate, sur-
veil and kill members of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and its associ-
ated forces.  Such killings have decimated the leadership of 
these groups and disrupted their operations.  However, there 
are collateral effects from UAV killings including civilian 
deaths.  These deaths increase resentment and hatred toward 
the US, which is channeled by terrorist groups to recruit new 
members and for local support.  Moreover, targeted killings 
outside a combat zone have political and diplomatic conse-
quences.  This paper argues that the current uses of UAV are 
legal under international and domestic law.  However, it pro-
poses amended targeting criteria, greater transparency and in-
creased checks on the executive branch for future use of UAVs. 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
* Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve, with duty at the International & Opera-
tional Law Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General; M.A., U.S. Army 
War College 2013; J.D., Hofstra University School of Law 1992; B.A., Univer-
sity of Delaware 1989.  I extend my deepest thanks to Colonel Brett Weigle 
for his support and advice with writing this article, and to the editors and 
staff of the Pace International Law Review for their hard work preparing the 
article for publication.  The views expressed in this article do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the United States Army, the United States Army Reserve, 
or the United States Government. 
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UNLAWFUL ANGELS OF DEATH? 
Michael J. Deegan* 
Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest 
in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct.  Even as we con-
front a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the 
United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the 
conduct of war. 
--President Barack Obama1 
 
Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, the Central In-
telligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense (DoD) 
have targeted numerous leaders of al-Qaida (AQ) and the Tali-
ban via unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly referred 
to as “drones.”2 These deaths have caused confusion in the 
ranks of AQ and the Taliban, and disruptions to their opera-
tions.  Generally speaking, the targeted strikes have assisted 
the United States and its allies in combating terrorist groups 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
* Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve, with duty at the International & Opera-
tional Law Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General; M.A., U.S. Army 
War College 2013; J.D., Hofstra University School of Law 1992; B.A., Univer-
sity of Delaware 1989.  I extend my deepest thanks to Colonel Brett Weigle 
for his support and advice with writing this article, and to the editors and 
staff of the Pace International Law Review for their hard work preparing the 
article for publication.  The views expressed in this article do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the United States Army, the United States Army Reserve, 
or the United States Government. 
1 President Barrack H. Obama, Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech 
(December 10, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
World/Global-News/2009/1210/text-of-barack-obamas-nobel-peace-prize-
acceptance-speech/(page)/4.). 
2 Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) refer to aircraft that fly without 
onboard pilots along with ground control stations, networks and personnel 
needed to operate these aircraft. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) refer to 
the unmanned aircraft in these systems, which are often referred to as drones 
in the media. BART ELIAS CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 42718PILOTLESS DRONES: 
BACKGROUND AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS REGARDING UNMANNED 
AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 1 n.1 (2012) (2012.   
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/7
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overseas.3  UAVs are unique weapon systems.  They can fly vir-
tually undetectable by the human eye, thousands of feet in the 
air, the ground below for more than a day, and once finding its 
target, bring a laser guided missile onto its mark, all without 
exposing the pilot to harm.4 
However, the UAV program is not without criticism from 
both inside and outside the United States (US).  Collateral ef-
fects include civilian deaths from the strikes on the intended 
targets.5  In addition, there are political effects that appear to 
counter security gains from targeted UAV strikes.  The leaders 
of many partner-nations face criticism from their citizenry for 
allowing the strikes to occur on their territory.  Foreign diplo-
mats and international scholars complain that the strikes vio-
late the sovereignty of countries that are outside a combat zone 
when the strikes are conducted without the affected country’s 
consent. Even with these criticisms, this application of national 
power by the United States government is consonant with both 
domestic and international law. 
This paper will argue that Congressional authorizations, 
the U.S. Constitution, international law, and the Law of Armed 
Conflict (LOAC) provide the legal justification for this method 
of employing lethal force in the manner it is currently conduct-
ed. It will recommend amended targeting criteria, and suggest 
US judicial review prior to the conduct of future drone strikes 
against suspected terrorists who are US citizens, and other re-
porting requirements to address some of the negative effects. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 In 2009, the Obama Administration requested DoD not use the term 
“Global War on Terror” as termed by the preceding administration, and re-
quested instead the term, “Overseas Contingency Operation” (OCO).  Scott 
Wilson and Al Kamen, “Global War on Terror is Given New Name,” 
WASHINGTON POST, March 25, 2009, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR200903
2402818.html. 
4 Predator RQ-1/ MQ-1 / MQ-9 Reaper UAV, United States of America, 
AIRFORCE-TECHNOLOGY.COM, http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/ 
predator-uav/ (last visited December 8, 2013). See also JEREMIAH GERTLER, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42136 U.S. UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS 1, 33 (2012).   
5 Michael J. Boyle, The Cost and Consequences of Drone Warfare, 89 INT’L 
AFFAIRS 1,5 (2013) (noting that all government data on death counts are clas-
sified). 
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, CAPABILITIES AND CRITICISMS  
A. The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle  
The use of unmanned aircraft is not a new concept for the 
US military.  Almost from the beginning of flight, the military 
has tried to use unmanned aircraft as a weapons system.  Dur-
ing World War I, the Navy attempted to develop a flying 
bomb.6 The Navy endeavored again during World War II by 
loading a B-24 Liberator with bombs for pilotless flight.7  In the 
1950s, the military used unmanned aircraft as targets for new 
pilots and as decoys in combat.8  During Vietnam and in the 
Balkans, the US employed unmanned aircraft for intelligence 
gathering.9  Following the attacks on September 11, 2001 (9-
11), the American military used UAVs in Afghanistan and Iraq 
for reconnaissance, surveillance, and later, combat strikes.10  
Today’s UAVs range in size from those the size of a typical 
remote controlled hobby airplane of less than ten pounds, to 
the size and weight of a large business jet.11  The smaller mod-
els are employed by troops in theater.  For instance, the RQ-14 
Dragon Eye is a small UAV that is carried in a backpack. Once 
deployed, the Dragon Eye can travel as far as 2.5 nautical 
miles from its operator.12  The larger models, such as the MQ-9 
Reaper, have satellite communications that provide for beyond 
line-of-sight operations.13  Thus, the “pilots” of the larger UAV !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 ELIAS, supra note 2, at 1. 
7 Id.; Lev Grossman, Drone Home, TIME MAGAZINE, Feb. 2013, at 2, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2135132-
2,00.html  (“The program was an utter failure, and it claimed the life of Jo-
seph Kennedy, older brother of the future President, when his B-24 blew up 
prematurely.”). 
8 ELIAS, supra note 2, at 1. 
9 Id.; see also Lev Grossman, Drone Home, Time Magazine, Feb. 11, 2013, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2135132-2,00.html; 
JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42136 US UNMANNED AERIAL 
SYSTEMS 4.     
10 ELIAS, supra note 2, at 1.  
11Jeremiah Gertler, Cong. Research Serv., R42136 US Unmanned Aerial 
Systems 36; see also UAS: Dragon, Aerovironment Inc.,http://www.avinc.com/ 
uas/small_uas/dragon_eye/. 
12 Jeremiah Gertler, Cong. Research Serv., R42136 US Unmanned Aerial 
Systems, 44.   
13 MQ-9 Reaper Predator B Unmanned Aircraft System UAS Drone, 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/7
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can operate and fly the aircraft thousands of miles from the ac-
tual location of the UAV.14   
 American journalist Lev Grossman describes UAV as 
“omniscient surveillance, surgical precision, zero risk.”15  UAVs 
also contain multiple systems.  One system provides instanta-
neous up-to-date intelligence, surveillance and reconnais-
sance.16  Another system allows for a weapon system that is a 
relatively inexpensive strike option.17  The use of UAV enhanc-
es the United States National Strategy for Counterterrorism: to 
bring targeted force on Al-Qaeda (AQ) to disrupt, dismantle 
and eventually defeat AQ, and its affiliates and adherents, in 
order to ensure the security of US citizens and interests.18  The 
UAV is similar in nature to a precision guided munition or 
“smart bomb” fired from a manned fighter jet.  However, the 
UAV operator has the ability to identify a target and surveil 
the individual virtually undetected, with little to no risk to its 
operator, and with the added benefit of keeping troops out of 
harm’s way.19 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
ARMY RECOGNITION http://www.armyrecognition.com/united_states_military_ 
equipment_uk/mq9_reaper_predator_b_unmanned_aircraft_system_uas_ 
data_sheet_specifications_information_pictures_u.html (last visited Feb 12, 
2014).   
14 Denise Chow, Drone Wars: Pilots Reveal Debilitating Stress Beyond 
Virtual Battlefield, LIVE SCIENCE (Nov. 5, 2013), 
http://www.livescience.com/40959-military-drone-war-psychology.html (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2013).  However, a pilot at the airfield controls take-off and 
landing of large UAV using a joystick.  
15 GERTLER, supra note 9, at 2.  
16 GERTLER, supra note 12, at 1, 9.  
17 Ashley Boyle, The US and its UAVs: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, American 
Security Project, AMERICAN SECURITY PROJECT (July 24, 2012), 
http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/the-us-and-its-uavs-a-cost-
benefit-analysis/ (last visited Dec.27, 2012); but see GERTLER, supra note 12, 
at 10, who reports some UAVs, such as the Global Hawk, cost more than sim-
ilar manned aircraft.      
18 THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM 2 
(2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_ 
strategy.pdf. 
19 Grossman, supra note 15, at 2. 
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B. Effects of UAV Strikes 
1. Killing AQ and Taliban leadership  
The employment of UAV is an effective tool in countering 
violent extremism.  UAV targeting has disrupted AQ and its af-
filiates, resulting in the deaths of 50 high-ranking AQ and Tal-
iban leaders. .20  President Obama has hailed his administra-
tion’s success in depleting the ranks of senior AQ leaders and 
making the U.S. safer.21  This “thinning” of AQ leadership is 
due in large part to the use of UAVs.22  Surveillance and intel-
ligence from UAVs were used for the successful 2011 raid by 
Navy SEALs on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan that 
led to his death.23  In fact, bin Laden papers found in his com-
pound  revealed that bin Laden languished the impact of UAV 
strikes and advised AQ leaders flee parts of Pakistan for safer 
areas.24   
High value targets that were killed via UAVs include Ab-
del Rehman al-Hussainan, the reported second in command of 
AQ who was killed in December 2012 in Pakistan.25  He alleg-
edly had replaced Abu Yahya al-Libi, who was killed by a UAV 
attack in the same area of Pakistan in June 2012.26  A top AQ 
operative and US citizen was killed in September 2011 in Yem-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Grossman, supra note 9, at 2. 
21 Michael D. Shear & Scott Shane, Congress to See Memo Backing Drone 
Attacks on Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/02/07/us/politics/obama-orders-release-of-drone-memos-to-
lawmakers.html?_r=0. 
22 Bob Orr, Drone Strike in Pakistan Targets al Qaeda Leader, CBS 
NEWS, June 5, 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/drone-strike-in-pakistan-
targets-al-qaeda-leader/. 
23 Greg Miller, CIA Flew Stealth Drones into Pakistan to Monitor Bin 
Laden House, WASH. POST, May 17, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/national-security/cia-flew-stealth-drones-into-pakistan-to-monitor-bin-
laden-house/2011/05/13/AF5dW55G_story.html. 
24 Peter Bergen, Bin Laden’s Final Days – Big Plans, Deep Fears, CNN, 
March 19, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/16/opinion/bergen-bin-laden-
final-writings/ (last visited May 6, 2014). 
25 Ismail Khan, U.S. Drone Strike Kills a Commander for Al Qaeda in 
Pakistan, N.Y.  TIMES, Dec. 9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/ 
world/asia/us-drone-strike-kills-a-senior-al-qaeda-commander.html. 
Hussainan was also known as Abu Zaid al-Kuwaiti. 
26 Id.  See also Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Questions Brennan Can’t 
Dodge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2013. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/7
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en when a UAV targeted Anwar al-Awlaki.27  Further, AQ’s 
chief scientist and master bomb-maker, Abu Khabab al-Masri, 
was a casualty of a UAV sortie in Pakistan in 2008.28   
2. Civilian Deaths  
The UAV strike that killed Hussainan also wounded 
Hussainan’ s daughter and wife (who later died from her 
wounds).29  This is but one example of the collateral damage 
from UAV targeting.  Former CIA Director and Defense Secre-
tary Leon Panetta has argued that UAVs are “remarkably pre-
cise and limited in terms of collateral damage”.30  However, 
other sources indicate a much larger footprint.  The Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism, a nonprofit news organization in 
Great Britain, “estimates the number of persons killed in drone 
attacks at 3,000 to 4,500 including well over 200 children.”31  
They estimate that civilian deaths as a percentage of total cas-
ualties from UAV attacks range between 18 to 26 percent in 
Pakistan, 16 percent in Yemen and between 7 to 33.5 percent 
in Somalia.32   
Another group cites lower, but still significant civilian cas-
ualties.  The New America Foundation reports that from June 
2004 to October 2012 there were 334 UAV strikes in Paki-
stan.33  These attacks were responsible for between 1,886 and 
3,191 deaths with an average of 7.4 to 9.6 persons killed per !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt & Robert F. Worth, Two-Year Manhunt 
Led to Killing of Awlaki in Yemen,” N.Y. Times, Sep. 30, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-
killed-in-yemen.html?pagewanted=all ( Awlaki was termed “the leader of ex-
ternal operations for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.”  The strike also 
killed Samir Khan, a U.S. citizen of Pakistani descent who was an editor of 
an AQ English online magazine.  One of the published articles was “Make a 
Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom”. 
28 Brian Michael Jenkins, Al Qaeda in Its Third Decade, Irreversible De-
cline or Imminent Victory?, RAND CORP. (2012) available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP362.html.  
29 Khan, supra note 25. 
30 Boyle, supra note 5, at 3. 
31 Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Questions Brennan Can’t Dodge. N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/opinion/the-questions-
brennan-cant-dodge.html?_r=0.  
32 Boyle, supra note 5, at 6.  
33 Id. at 5. 
7
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strike.34  The group labels 85 percent of those killed as “mili-
tants” from the period of 2004 to 2012.35  This is a dramatic de-
crease in civilian casualties as compared to previous years..  
Based on the group’s figures, from 2004 to 2007, noncombatant 
deaths in Pakistan comprised more than 50 percent of the UAV 
strikes.36  By 2011, civilian fatalities had dropped to 1 percent 
of all UAV assaults in Pakistan.37  The low percentages contin-
ued into 2012.38  The lower rate of civilian casualties are be-
lieved to be the result of greater scrutiny by the Obama Admin-
istration prior to approval of a strike involving the potential for 
civilian casualties. Smaller munitions used for a smaller blast 
radius prolonged the dwell-time over the objective; and result-
ed in less strikes.39   
 For numerous reasons the data on civilian deaths are 
mere estimates.  First, the attacks usually occur in remote and 
sometimes uncontrolled territories where a formal constabu-
lary is not established.40  Second, relatives of the casualties 
remove the bodies from the area and quickly bury them in ac-
cordance with Muslim law preventing identification and the 
number of individuals killed.41  Third, AQ and the Taliban ex-
aggerate the number of civilians killed for propaganda and re-
cruitment purposes.42  Lastly, the US classifies details of UAV 
strikes thereby precluding dissemination of this information. 43 
 Due to the number of civilians killed and the public out-
cry of alleged indiscriminate killings by UAVs, a United Na-
tions panel convened in 2013 to investigate whether unlawful 
killings had occurred.  The investigation is centered on 25 re-
cent UAV strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Peter Bergen, Civilian Casualties Plummet in Drone Strikes, CNN  
(July 14, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/13/opinion/bergen- 
civilian-casualties. 
39 Id. 
40 Boyle, supra note 5, at 6. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. Boyle also indicates that United States officials underestimate the 
number of civilian casualties from UAV strikes. 
43 Id. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/7
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and the Palestinian territories.44  The panel is also investigat-
ing the alleged “double-tap” UAV attacks, which killed individ-
uals who were attending funerals of  those who died in an ear-
lier strike, and spectators visiting the bomb scene.45  An 
interim report was issued in September 2013.46  The Special 
Rapporteur found 33 UAV strikes that caused civilian casual-
ties, but did not render an opinion as to whether any deaths vi-
olated international law.47  The September report calls for 
greater transparency by States who utilize UAVs that involve 
lethal targeting.48  A subsequent report was issued in March 
2014.  Key findings disclosed a reduction in UAV strikes in 
2013 in Pakistan, but increased strikes in Afghanistan and 
Yemen.49    Per the report, civilian casualties had increased 
three-fold in 2013 in Afghanistan compared to 2012, accounting 
for 45 deaths and 14 non-fatal injuries.50  The Special Rappor-
teur reiterated a previous conclusion that States have an obli-
gation following a UAV strike that results in civilian casualties 
to “conduct a prompt, independent and impartial fact-finding 
inquiry and to provide a detailed public explanation of the re-
sults.”51 
3. Deaths Used for Recruitment and anti-American Sentiment 
In addition to the number of civilians killed, each death 
“represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and 
more recruits for [whatever] militant movement” can tap into 
that hatred.52  Visceral feelings are not limited to the affected !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 John F. Burns, U.N. Panel to Investigate Rise in Drone Strikes, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/world/europe/un-
panel-to-investigate-rise-in-drone-strikes.html?_r=0. 
45  Id. 
46 G.A. Res. 66/171, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/389 (Sept. 18, 2013). 
47 G.A. Res. 66/171, supra note 46, ¶ 21. 
48G.A. Res. 66/171, supra note 46, ¶ 45. 
49 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Counter-
ing Terrorism, Ben Emmerson, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/59, March 11, 2014, ¶¶ 
25-26, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/119/49/PDF/ 
G1411949.pdf?OpenElement.   
50 Id. at 6, para. 25. 
51 Id. at 8-9, para. 32. 
52 David Kilcullen & Andrew McDonald Exum, Death from Above, Out-
rage Down Below, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
9
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area, but extend to the greater population in the targeted re-
gion.  As the local population sees it, when their government 
cannot protect them from UAV strikes by the US, they become 
antagonistic toward their government, resulting in a weakened 
State.53  This environment is perfect for terrorist safe havens: 
the local populace feels disenfranchised from the government 
thereby decreasing the stability of the affected State.54  Moreo-
ver, the hatred is easy to channel by terrorists despite the fact 
that the terrorists and the angry population may hold different 
political or religious philosophies.55  Farea al-Muslimi, a Yeme-
ni appearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee in April 
2013, testified that UAV strikes are now “the face of Ameri-
ca.”56  He emphasized his point by stating, “What violent mili-
tants had previously failed to achieve, one drone strike 
achieved in an instant.”57   
4. Potential for Decreased Support from Allies  
One UAV attack in Pakistan in 2011, which allegedly 
killed 40 civilians when the US confused a tribal meeting for an 
assemblage of terrorists, has prompted a lawsuit by the survi-
vors’ families against the British government.58  The plaintiffs 
in that suit allege that British officials are liable for the deaths 
that occurred because they gave  intelligence to Americans who 
used the information for subsequent UAV strikes, including the 
one that killed the plaintiffs’ family members.59  Judges have 
yet to decide whether to hear the case, but it may create a 
chilling effect on US allies who pass intelligence to the US.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html?pagewanted=all. 
53 See Boyle, supra note 5, at 3. 
54 See id. at 18. See also Kilcullen & Exum, supra note 49. 
55 See Thousands rally in Pakistan against US drone attacks, HURRIYET 
DAILY NEWS (Dec. 1, 2013), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/thousands 
-rally-in-pakistan-against-us-drone attacks.aspx?PageID=238&NID= 
58810&NewsCatID=356.  
56 Charlie Savage, Drone Strikes Turn Allies into Enemies Yemeni Says, 
N.Y. TIMES) (Apr. 23, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/ 
world/middleeast/judiciary-panel-hears-testimony-on-use-of-drones.html 
57 Id. 
58 Ravi Somaiya, Drone Strike Prompts Suit, Raising Fears for U.S. Al-
lies, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 30, 2013), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/world/drone-strike-lawsuit-raises 
-concerns-on-intelligence-sharing.html. 
59 Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/7
7. MICHAEL DEEGAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/24/14  10:56 PM 
258 PACE INT’L L. REV. PUBLIC EDITION [Vol.  26::2 
The British are the United States’ greatest allies in countering 
violent extremism.60  Other nations, such as Germany and the 
Netherlands, also supply intelligence to the US, and may cut 
intelligence sharing for fear of similar lawsuits.61  Any decrease 
in the flow of intelligence will curtail America’s goal to disrupt, 
dismantle and defeat AQ and its affiliates. 62 
 Criticism also concerns UAV strikes that occur in Paki-
stan, Yemen and Somalia, nations outside the borders of Af-
ghanistan.  Critics argue that attacks in countries outside a 
war zone and without the consent of the affected government 
violate the country’s sovereignty and are possibly acts of war.63  
The Obama Administration dismisses these arguments since 
AQ and its affiliates are “transnational, non-State actors where 
the principal theater of operations is not in a country in conflict 
with America.”64  Thus, boundaries are irrelevant, similar to 
the global war zone of World War II.  While most Americans 
support UAV strikes overseas to target terrorists,65 many, 
however, would not support UAV assaults within the US.66   
C. UAV Operations over American Territory 
The U.S. Attorney General has stated that UAV targeting !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Louis Charbonneau, U.S. drone Strikes Violate Pakistan’s Sovereignty: 
U.N., REUTERS, (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/15/ 
us-un-drones-idUSBRE92E0Y320130315. 
64 O’Connell, supra note 26.  
65 John Sides, Most Americans Approve of Foreign Drone Strikes, 
WASHINGTON POST, (Mar. 10, 2013), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/10/most-
americans-approve-of-foreign-drone-strikes/. This article cites a Pew Center 
poll, which conducted a random survey of Americans. They were asked 
whether they supported “the United States conducting missile strikes from 
pilotless aircraft called drones to target extremists in countries such as Paki-
stan, Yemen and Somalia?” The results were that 56 percent approved of the 
strikes, 26 percent disapproved and 18 percent were undecided.  See also Me-
gan Thee-Brenan, Poll Shows Isolationist Streak in Americans, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 1, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/world/ 
american-public-opposes-action-in-syria-and-north-korea.html (also citing a 
New York Times/CBS News poll demonstrating that 70 percent of those 
polled favor the use of UAV to carry out attacks against terrorists overseas).  
66  See Thee-Brenan, supra note 62. 
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in the U.S. is a possibility in an “extraordinary circumstance” 
to prevent an attack similar to Pearl Harbor or 9-11.67  This is 
not as remote of a possibility as one would think.  The Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) Modernization and Reform Act 
of 2012 “requires the FAA to begin integrating unmanned air-
craft into the national airspace system by the end of fiscal year 
2015.”68  The FAA currently consents to the use of unmanned 
aircraft by public entities such as law enforcement on an indi-
vidual basis.  However, requests for such use have increased 
dramatically in recent years.69  Few Americans support UAV 
targeting in the U.S. against a suspected terrorist, regardless 
of whether the suspected terrorist is a U.S. citizen or not.70  On-
ly 25 percent support UAV airstrikes in the US against sus-
pected foreign terrorist living in the U.S., and the support is 
even less for UAV targeting of US citizens living in the U.S. 
who are suspected terrorists (13%).71   
One rationale for the low support is that most Americans 
perceive UAVs as an instrument of the military or CIA, not of 
law enforcement.  Americans have long-standing suspicions 
against using the military in a law enforcement capacity (e.g., 
the Posse Comitatus Act).72  However, the weapon system on a 
UAV is just like any other lethal weapon used by the police.  In 
that light, the inquiry should revolve around the imminence of 
the danger, and the lack of a less violent alternative.  Current 
law dictates that lethal force against a criminal suspect is per-
missible when the police officer has probable cause to fear for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 Terry Frieden, Holder Does Not Rule Out Drone Strike Scenario in 
U.S., CNN (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/05/politics/obama-
drones-cia. 
68 Elias, supra note 2, at Summary. 
69 Id. at 5.   
70 Alyssa Brown and Frank Newport, In U.S., 65% Support Drone At-
tacks on Terrorists Abroad, GALLUP POLITICS,(Mar. 25, 2013), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/161474/support-drone-attacks-terrorists-
abroad.aspx. 
71 Id. 
72 18 U.S.C. § 1385. The Posse Comitatus Act was a compromise to end 
Reconstruction and was due to southerners’ abhorrence of federal troops serv-
ing in law enforcement capacities after the Civil War.  The Act prevents using 
federal troops to enforce laws generally carried out by police.  See Sydney J. 
Freedberg, Jr., Posse Comitatus: Tiny Law, Big Impact, NAT’L J. Nov.12, 
2005, at 3557. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/7
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his or her life, or the lives of others.73  Therefore, the question 
should center on whether there is probable cause or an immi-
nent threat that precludes apprehension.     
Another possible concern regarding the use of UAV within 
the U.S. is the belief in the right to privacy, and the fear that 
America will become akin to George Orwell’s novel Nineteen 
Eighty-four in which the government is engaged in omnipres-
ent surveillance.74 Because of these apprehensions, legislators 
in Florida, Virginia and Idaho passed laws that prevent UAV 
observation by law enforcement at public gatherings.75  There 
are likewise more than 30 proposed laws under consideration 
across the US that are similar to the laws already in effect.76  
The current laws do not preclude the police from using UAVs to 
locate a fleeing suspect or in an emergency.77 
These concerns raise the issue of a foreign nation conduct-
ing strikes against its own list of alleged terrorists on American 
soil.  Has the U.S. set a precedent for strikes within the borders 
of a foreign nation, without the consent of that nation, based on 
a declared war on a group or groups within that nation’s popu-
lace?  The only known States that have armed UAV capabili-
ties are Israel, Great Britain and possibly Italy.78  Several oth-
er nations are known to be seeking them: France, Germany, 
Turkey, India, Russia, Taiwan, China, Iran, South Korea, Pa-
kistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.79  
Hezbollah has launched a crude, Iranian-made UAV, that car-
ries an eighty-eight pound armament, which is activated when 
the UAV slams into its mark (Israel has intercepted several of 
these sorties).80  Based on current data, it is unlikely that most 
States or non-State actors will have a long-range, armed UAV 
within ten years to threaten the U.S. security interests or those 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).   
74 See generally George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949).   
75 Maggie Clark, After Boston, Police Use of Drones Debated, POLITICO, 
May 6, 2013. 
76 Id.  
77 Id. 
78 Micah Zenko, Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, COUNCIL SPECIAL REPORT NO. 65 (2013).   
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 21. 
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on U.S. soil.81  Lack of capability, however, does not equate to 
lack of weighing an option. Nevertheless, this paper will show 
that the US has set the precedent for other States to lawfully 
conduct UAV strikes within the US.   
 The rules for targeting remain classified by both the US 
DoD and the CIA.82  There is no congressional or judicial over-
sight - the Justice Department asserts dominion remains solely 
in the executive branch of government.83  Thus, any legal anal-
yses that justify the killings are not released to the public or 
any other government agency outside the executive branch.  
The lack of disclosure invites the criticism that UAV killings 
are indiscriminate and not in conformity with US or interna-
tional law.84 
 Sections II, III and IV of this paper will use three con-
cepts to affirm a legal basis for the use of UAV strikes outside a 
war zone.   
II. TARGETING UNDER JUS AD BELLUM 
A. Customary International Law, the United Nations Charter 
and Self-Defense 
When one State can use force against another is guided by 
the principles of jus ad bellum or the “right to wage war.”85  
This concept requires a State to only resort to force in limited 
circumstances, which are codified in the United Nations Char-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 Id. at 20-21. 
82 Mary Ellen O’Connell, Op-Ed., The Questions Brennan Can’t Dodge, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/opinion/the-
questions-brennan-cant-dodge.html.  Critics have accused President Obama 
of hypocrisy for keeping the legal opinions that justify UAV targeting secret, 
noting that shortly after his inauguration he ordered the public release of 
classified memos governing CIA interrogations under President George W. 
Bush.  See also Michael Shear & Scott Shane, Congress to See Memo, N.Y. 
Times  Feb. 6, 2013.  
83 O’Connell, supra note 79.  
84 Lev Grossman, Drone Home, TIME MAGAZINE, Feb. 11, 2013. Critics al-
so charge the US has engaged in “signature strikes” aimed at anyone “whose 
behavior conforms to suspicious patterns,” not just high-level AQ members. 
85 Kurt Larson & Zachary Malamud, The United States, Pakistan, the 
Law of War and the Legality of the Drone Attacks, J. INT'L BUS. & L. 1, 2 
(2011). 
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ter and customary international law (CIL).86  Those limited cir-
cumstances include self-defense, or when a state has authoriza-
tion from the United Nations Security Council.87   
 The United Nations (UN) Charter attempts to restrict 
States from using force against another State or “against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State”.88  
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that “All members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state …”89 These restrictions are in accordance with the 
central theme of the UN Charter: States should respect each 
other’s internal affairs and national sovereignty.90 
 As mentioned above, there are instances where a State 
may justifiably use force against another State or within a 
State’s borders.  The first is where a State can claim their ac-
tions were in self-defense, and the second is when the force is 
authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter.91  The use of force in self-defense is based on 
CIL, which was codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter: 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Secu-
rity Council has taken measures necessary to maintain inter-
national peace and security....”92   
There are two types of self-defense: individual and collec-
tive.93  Individual self-defense is generally thought to include a 
State’s right to protect its territorial integrity, its political in-
dependence and the protection of its citizens and their property 
abroad.94  Collective self-defense is the right of a State to re-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86 Id. at, 4. 
87 U.N. Charter  art. 51, 
88 U.N. Charter art. 2(4). 
89 Id. 
90 U.N. Charter  art. 2. 
91 Id.; see also U.N. Charter, art. 39.  “The Security Council shall deter-
mine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall 
be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore inter-
national peace and security.” 
92 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
93 Id. 
94 Richard DiMeglio, et al., Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook 35 ( The 
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ceive support from or join with another State to react to an at-
tack or fend off an attack.95  Prior to a Security Council author-
ization, the Council will examine the act of aggression and 
make a determination concerning how the international peace 
and security can be restored.96 
 
B. Authorizations under United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions and Operation Enduring Freedom 
The UN Security Council implicitly recognized the right of 
a State to take action in self-defense following a terrorist at-
tack in Security Council Resolution 1368 (SCR 1368).97  This 
occurred following AQ’s attack on the US on 9-11.98  The reso-
lution “unequivocally condemn[ed] in the strongest terms the 
horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September 
2001 … and regard[ed] such acts, like any act of international 
terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security …”99 
The Security Council reiterated its position in SCR 1373 less 
than three weeks after 9-11, affirming “the need to combat by 
all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions, threats to international peace and security caused by ter-
rorist acts …”100  The resolution also recognized a duty of each 
State to not ignore terrorist activities within its borders stat-
ing, “every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, insti-
gating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another 
State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory 
directed towards the commission of such acts …”101  In line 
with the sentiments of SCRs 1368 and 1373, the U.S. invaded 
Afghanistan and attacked both AQ and the then-government of 
Afghanistan, the Taliban, on October 7, 2011.  The operation 
was termed Enduring Freedom (OEF). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army 2012), 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LOAC-Deskbook-2012.pdf. 
95 Id. at 36. 
96 U.N. Charter art. 42.   
97 S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001), available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3c4e94557.html. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 S.C. Red. 1373, U.N. Doc. 1373, S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001), available 
at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/un/6135.htm 
101 Id.   
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 The US and its allied forces involved in OEF used the 
basis of self-defense as the justification for the use of force to 
invade Afghanistan.   The US Ambassador to the United Na-
tions at the time, John Negroponte, notified the Security Coun-
cil of the invasion and cited self-defense as its justification: 
 
In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Na-
tions, I wish, on behalf of my Government, to report that the 
United States of America, together with other States, has initiat-
ed actions in the exercise of its inherent right of individual and 
collective self-defense following the armed attacks that were car-
ried out against the United States on 11 September 2001…102 
 
The international community recognized the right of the 
US to use force against AQ and the Taliban, even though re-
sponding to terrorist attacks was historically a matter for law 
enforcement.  International entities such as the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, the European Union and the Organiza-
tion of American States joined in condemning the attacks and 
recognized the right of the US to defend itself.103  Even unlikely 
advocates, such as China and Russia, endorsed OEF.104  Thus, 
UAV strikes remain necessary to decimate AQ leadership and 
keep their training and subversive efforts thwarted.  No other 
known means are as effective as UAV strikes for these purpos-
es.105 
1. Proportionality  
 The other test under jus ad bellum is proportionality, 
which limits the force to what is necessary to circumvent the 
threat.106  However, proportionality does not require an eye for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102 Letter of John Negroponte to the President of the Security Council, 
AVALON.LAW.YALE.EDU, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/un_006.asp (last vis-
ited Apr. 4, 2013).   
103 Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to Transnational Terrorism Under 
the Jus Ad Bellum: A Normative Framework, 56 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2008).   
104 Id. 
105 Daniel L. Byman, Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s 
Weapon of Choice, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, July/August 2013, 
available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-
obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman#.  
106 Schmitt, Responding to Transnational Terrorism, at 16.   
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an eye or parity between the terrorist attack and the State’s re-
sponse.107  Critics argue that UAV strikes are no longer propor-
tional to the attacks on 9-11 given the architects of 9-11 were 
killed or captured.  This is likewise a narrow, “tit for tat” anal-
ysis.  AQ still seeks weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to in-
flict on the West’s nuclear capabilities are not the only WMD 
that AQ seeks. Toxins such as ricin, anthrax and botulinum 
toxin “appear in several AQ post-September 11 terrorist 
plots.”108  The employment of UAVs have curtailed these pur-
suits.  Al Qaeda’s WMD program was impeded in 2008 when 
AQ’s “chief scientist and master bomb-maker,” Abu Khabab al-
Masri was killed by a UAV operation in Pakistan.109  Thus, in 
this instance the proportionality test was met because the kill-
ing by UAV greatly outweighed the mass destruction that could 
have occurred if al-Masri and AQ continued in their pursuit of 
WMDs.  
D. Anticipatory Self-Defense  
Another criticism of the UAV program is the force used by 
the US is no longer grounded in self-defense.  The U.S. sub-
scribes to the theory of anticipatory self-defense.110  Under this 
concept, the U.S. is not required to wait for an attack before it 
can defend itself.  Instead, it may repel an imminent attack be-
fore it occurs.111  This analysis is logical.  As stated by Professor 
Yoram Dinstein of Tel Aviv University, “[i]t [is] absurd to re-
quire that the defending State should sustain and absorb a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107 Id. 
108 Jenkins, Al Qaeda in Its Third Decade, at 3. 
109 Id. 
110 The concept is not new.  In 1914, former Senator and Secretary of 
State, Elihu Root, stated “Every sovereign state [has the right] to protect it-
self by preventing a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect 
itself.”  Michael Gerson, “Obama’s Drone Policy, Rooted in Self-Defense, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2013. 
111 Some in the international community advocate the very narrow view 
that a State may only use force following an armed attack and then only after 
the Security Council takes effective action per United Nations Charter, Arti-
cle 51. U.N. Charter art. 51.  In their view, the Charter eliminated the con-
cept of anticipatory self-defense, and the right of a State to act independently 
of the Security Council.  The United States takes the opposite opinion, con-
tending that the inherent right of self-defense was not expunged by the UN 
Charter. 
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devastating (perhaps a fatal) blow, only to prove the immacu-
late conception of self-defence.”112  Anticipatory self-defense 
makes sense, especially in response to terrorism.  Since terror-
ist groups do not have the resources to match arms with the 
target State, they must rely on surprise to exert the greatest 
effects.  Thus, catching a State unaware is the objective.  As ar-
ticulated by President George W. Bush in his 2002 National 
Security Strategy (NSS): 
 
[Terrorists] rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of 
weapons of mass destruction - weapons that can be easily con-
cealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning …To fore-
stall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United 
States will, if necessary, act preemptively.113  
 
This position was reinforced four years later in President 
Bush’s 2006 NSS:  
 
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities 
and objectives of today’s adversaries … The greater the threat, 
the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the 
case for taking action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty 
remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.114   
 
The Obama Administration has likewise taken the position 
that UAV strikes are justified under an anticipatory self-
defense basis.115 The key to anticipatory self-defense is that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
112 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defence, 191 (Cambridge, 
4th ed., 2005). cited by Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to Transnational Ter-
rorism under the Jus ad Bellum: A Normative Framework, NAVAL L. REV. 23, 
64 (2008). 
113 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States 
of America (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), 15.  
114 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States 
of America (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2006), 18. 
115 Eric Holder, Attorney General of the United States, Speech to North-
western University School of Law, (March 5, 2012) available at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html 
(“Given these facts, the Constitution does not require the President to delay 
action until some theoretical end-stage of planning – when the precise time, 
place, and manner of an attack become clear. Such a requirement would cre-
ate an unacceptably high risk that our efforts would fail, and that Americans 
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action is made to forego an imminent armed attack.   
 Critics of the America’s interpretation of anticipatory 
self-defense assail it as preventative, and thus illegal under in-
ternational law.116  They argue that the window of opportunity 
to prevent a terrorist attack is generally so small and obscure 
to render anticipatory self-defense unavailing.117  Professor Mi-
chael Schmitt of the US Naval War College advocates a two-
pronged test before anticipatory self-defense is employed 
against non-State terrorists.118  First, the State must identify a 
group with intent to execute an attack against the State.  Se-
cond, the group must make significant advancement toward ob-
taining the manner to execute an attack.  Therefore, the test 
involves intent to attack by a group and an overt act towards 
carrying out the attack. This test is reasonable and should as-
sure the international community that States are not acting 
indiscriminately when targeting non-State actors. 
E. State Sovereignty  
However, even if Professor Schmitt’s test is satisfied, does 
that allow one State to violate the sovereignty of a second State 
in order to launch an attack against a non-State actor operat-
ing within the borders of that second State?  Sovereignty is the 
right of a State to be free from outside meddling and incursion.  
As mentioned earlier, it is a fundamental right in CIL and ar-
ticulated in the UN Charter.119  Critics of the UAV program 
contend that the US does not have the right to violate another 
State’s sovereignty, outside of a combat zone, even if there is a 
legitimate target and other jus ad bellum criteria are met (E.g., 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
would be killed.”).  
116 Eustace Chikere Azubuike, Probing the Scope of Self Defense in Inter-
national Law, ANNUAL SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW, Vol. 
17: Iss. 1, Article 8 available at http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ 
annlsurvey/vol17/iss1/8. 
117 Sean D. Murphy,The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 Vill. L. 
Rev. 699 (2005).  
118 Schmitt, supra note 112, at 65. 
119 “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independ-
ence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations.”  U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
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necessity and proportionality).120  
 Nevertheless, sovereignty should not take precedence 
over self-defense.  Outside the recent combat zones of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the US has engaged in UAV strikes primarily in 
Pakistan, but also in Yemen and Somalia.121  Some of these 
strikes were undertaken with the consent of the “host” nation, 
while others were not.122  It is lawful for another State to con-
duct counter-terrorist operations with the consent of the host 
State.123  For example, in cooperation with Yemeni officials, the 
US administered a UAV strike in 2012 on a group intending to 
attack Yemeni troops.124  Nine people were killed including 
Nader al-Shaddadi, a leader of the local branch of AQ.125  The 
issue is less clear, however, when no explicit consent is given 
by the host State. 
 Many times, the US does not obtain the express consent 
of the host State prior to UAV strikes, only tacit consent.   Po-
litical reasons or internal instability may prevent a host State 
from giving express consent.   For instance, Pakistan’s refusal 
to give express consent after notification from the U.S. of its in-
tent to conduct UAV strikes could serve the competing designs 
of maintaining good relations with the U.S., while dissociating 
Pakistan from UAV operations, which are abhorred by its citi-
zens.126  In an April 2012 speech, White House counterterror-
ism advisor (now CIA Director), John Brennan, said the Obama 
Administration concluded there is no law barring the U.S. from !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
120 O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones, at 19. 
121 O’Connell, The Questions Brennan Can’t Dodge. 
122 Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman, & Evan Perez, U.S. Unease Over 
Drone Strikes, WALL ST. J., September 26, 2012. 
123 Schmitt, supra note 112, at 67; but see, O’Connell, Unlawful Killing 
with Combat Drones, at 16.  Professor O’Connell asserts that it is unlawful to 
use drone outside of a combat zone even if the State consents to the strike 
within the State’s borders. 
124 Nasser Arrabyee, Qaeda Leader Reported Dead in Yemen Attack, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/19/world/middleeast/ 
yemen-drone-strike-al-qaeda.html.  
125 Id. 
126 Entous, et al., supra note 129 (“Approximately once a month, the CIA 
sends a fax to Pakistani intelligence outlining broad areas where the US in-
tends to conduct UAV strikes.  The Pakistanis do not respond.”  Although the 
Pakistanis do not formally reply, they clear airspace for the UAV and do not 
interfere with the aircraft in any way.  The US takes these actions and omis-
sions as tacit consent.).  
21
7. MICHAEL DEEGAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/24/14  10:56 PM 
2014] UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES  269 
using lethal force outside of a combat zone, “provided the coun-
try involved consents or is unable or unwilling to take action 
against the threat.”127  One month before, Attorney General Er-
ic Holder articulated this same doctrine known as “unwilling or 
unable.”128 
F. The “Unwilling or Unable” Doctrine  
The unwilling or unable doctrine is grounded in the philos-
ophy that a State “cannot be deprived of its right to defend it-
self, but at the same time must allow the host State a reasona-
ble opportunity to remedy the matters before suffering a non-
consensual violation of its territory.”129  Aside from responding 
to requests from another State to infringe on a host State’s ter-
ritory, all States are responsible to maintain order in their do-
main, making certain their territory is not utilized to the im-
pairment of another State’s security.130  The Taliban did not do 
this, instead allowing AQ to establish training camps and plot 
terrorist activities including those involving 9-11 within its 
borders.131  The U.S. gave warning to the Taliban prior to 
launching OEF, demanding that they turn over bin Laden and 
those who planned the terrorist attack.132  The Taliban re-
fused,133 and their regime was toppled shortly thereafter.134    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
127 Id. This doctrine is also articulated by Professor Dinstein cited by 
Schmitt, Responding to Transnational Terrorism, at 21-22.    
128 Attorney Gen., Eric Holder, Speech to Northwestern University Sch. 
of Law (Mar. 5, 2012). 
129 Schmitt, supra note 112, at 70. 
130 Id. 23-24 (Citing the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case of Corfu 
Channel in which it held that every State had an obligation to not knowingly 
allow its territory be used for acts contrary to the rights of others).  But see 
the ICJ cases of Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. 
Congo v. Uganda), 2005, I.C.J. 25 (Dec. 19), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/116/10521.pdf, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/?sum=367&code=nus&p1=3&p2=3&case=70&k=66&p3=5; U.N. 
Secretary-General, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/L.16 (Dec. 3, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1497.pdf. 
131 Schmitt, supra note 136, at 22. 
132 John F. Burns WITH Christopher S. Wren, Without Evidence, the Tali-
ban Refuses to Turn Over bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/21/international/21CND-PAK.html. 
133 Id. 
134 Jayshree Bajoria AND Zachary Laub, The Taliban in Afghanistan, 
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Security Council Resolution 1373 also recognizes the duty 
of a State to refrain from instigating, assisting or acquiescing 
in organized terrorist activities within its borders: “[E]very 
State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, as-
sisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or ac-
quiescing in organized activities within its territory directed 
towards the commission of such acts.…”135  Thus, there are ac-
tions which could make the host State complicit in the activi-
ties of a terrorist organization acting within its borders, allow-
ing the offended State to act in self-defense against the host 
State (e.g., the Taliban in Afghanistan).  
It is possible that the host State is unaware of the actions 
within its borders, or which actions the victim State wishes to 
take or have taken within the host State.  Thus, the victim 
State must make a demand on the host State to fix the com-
plained wrong, and give the host State a reasonable time to 
comply.136  The failure of the government of the host State to do 
so because it is unwilling or unable provides the victim State 
the right to intervene within the host State’s borders.  The in-
tervention must be restricted to addressing the hazard within 
the host State as expeditiously and precisely as possible.137 
G. Summary Analysis under Jus ad Bellum  
The United States use of UAVs is compliant with the prin-
ciples of Jus ad Bellum.  Under this concept, a State is justified 
in using force in self-defense.  The UN Security Council recog-
nized such a right following the terrorist attack of 9-11 in vari-
ous resolutions in 2001.  America asserted the right of self-
defense to invade Afghanistan, and allies and UN Member 
States endorsed the actions of the U.S.  Although more than a 
decade has passed since the invasion of Afghanistan, the threat 
of violent extremism from AQ and its associated forces still ex-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551 (last visited Feb 
12, 2014). 
135 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Security Council, Resolution 1373, S/RES/1377, 
September 28, 2001, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm 
(accessed 4/2/13).  The resolution goes into much detail on the acts or omis-
sions that are considered unlawful actions by States in relation to the preven-
tion of terrorist activities.  
136 Schmitt, supra note 136, at 27. 
137 Schmitt, supra note 136.  
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ists today.  Given such, America’s invocation of anticipatory 
self-defense is necessary to forego a future attack.  Outside of a 
combat zone, UAV strikes are lawful when the U.S. obtains the 
consent of the State where the attack will occur, or when the 
State is unwilling or unable to confront the threat.   
III. TARGETING UNDER JUS IN BELLO 
A. Introduction to Jus in Bello 
The previous analysis under jus ad bellum took into ac-
count when force is permissible. Similarly, the rules on the type 
or means of military force are guided by the principles of jus in 
bello (law of war).138  Jus in bello is primarily codified in the 
Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and CIL, and is 
guided by the principles of military necessity, distinction, pro-
portionality and humanity.139  These principles explicitly define 
what and who may be targeted and how such targeting may oc-
cur.   
B. Military Necessity  
Military necessity is the means necessary to obtain mili-
tary objectives.  Military objectives are “those objects which by 
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contri-
bution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, 
capture or neutralization … offers a definite military ad-
vantage.”140  Only military targets are lawful objects for direct 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
138 It is DoD policy to ensure compliance with the law of war regardless of 
level of armed conflict or how the conflict is characterized.  U.S. Department 
of Defense, Department of Defense Law of War Program, Department of De-
fense Directive 2311.01E (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May 
9, 2006), paragraph 4.1. However, some scholars argue that the LOAC does 
not apply to AQ or its associated forces since they do not meet the legal 
standards, such as wearing uniforms or following the customs of warfare.  See 
Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of 
War, 95 VA. L. REV. 1745 (2009), http://insct.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2013/03/Sitaraman-Ganesh.CT-GWOT-and-the-LOAC.2009.2.pdf.   
139 This analysis is separate and distinct from the jus ad bellum analysis 
of necessity and proportionality described above in Section II.C.  
140 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Targeting, Joint Publication 3-60 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 31, 2013) E-2. 
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attack.141  CIL makes a distinction between combatants and 
noncombatants (usually – but not always – civilians).  Combat-
ants, and those participating in hostilities that have demon-
strated a hostile intent or performed a hostile act, may be tar-
geted.142  Civilians cannot be targeted nor can other people who 
are hors de combat or “outside the fight.”143  Persons that fit 
this definition include prisoners of war, medical personnel en-
gaged in medical duties, and combatants who are wounded and 
who cease to fight.144   
 Civilian status is presumed until there is evidence to the 
contrary.145  Given that AQ members do not wear distinctive 
insignia or uniforms that separate them from civilians, a State 
is required to conduct an analysis prior to a UAV strike to en-
sure the person is a proper military target.   This author pro-
poses the following test prior to UAV targeting: (1) that the po-
tential target is a member of AQ or its affiliate organizations; 
(2) that the target has taken or is currently engaged in actions 
against the US that have caused or could cause death or physi-
cal injury to US citizens or significant destruction of US prop-
erty; (3) the target continues to participate in the activities of 
AQ or its affiliate organizations; and (4) the target has not re-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
141 Trevor A. Keck, Not all Civilians are Created Equal: The Principles of 
Distinction, the Question of Direct Participation in Hostilities and Evolving 
Restraints on the Use of Force in Warfare, 211 MIL. L. REV.  115 (2012). 
142 Id. 
143 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Con-
flicts art. 50, 51, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609,  [hereinafter Protocol Ad-
ditional to the Geneva Convention].  However, civilians can lose their protec-
tion “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”  See, Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Convention, Id. at article 51(3). 
144 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment to Prisoners of War and 
Medical Personnel art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [here-
inafter GC I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 24, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC II].  
145 AP I, article 50(1). Some have referred to terrorists as “unlawful com-
batants”, “irregular forces” or “unprivileged enemy belligerents” since they do 
not fall into the definition of “combatants” as conceived in the Geneva Con-
ventions. Other scholars argue that AQ are enemy combatants that Congress 
has authorized the use of force against.  See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005)  (This essay concludes that AQ and its associated 
forces are enemy combatants in which LOAC applies). 
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nounced his membership and prior actions.146   
Using the example of an improvised explosive device (IED), 
there are numerous people involved in the execution of said de-
vice. There is the logistics person who obtains the “ingredi-
ents”: for instance, a cell phone, gunpowder, wiring, fuses, pro-
jectiles and a container.  He or she may deliver these 
components to the maker or assembler of the IED.  A cell lead-
er may select a location for emplacement of the IED.  One or 
more persons may place the IED in the ground, a car or other 
undetectable place.  There may be spotters who signal a trig-
german to detonate the IED to ensure maximum casualties in 
the target area.  Thus, one IED attack may involve as many as 
six or more persons who have taken a direct part in the terror-
ist act.  Each of them could be targeted by a UAV.  While there 
may be policy and/or strategic reasons to the contrary, each of 
these participants is a proper military target under jus in bel-
lo.147   
C. Distinction  
In addition to military necessity, distinction is the princi-
ple of jus in bello that ensures that only proper parties are tar-
geted.  For example, it is unlawful to target civilians or medical 
personnel engaged in medical duties.148  Critics of UAV strikes 
have alleged that vast numbers of civilians are killed along !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
146 This proposed test is similar to the loss of protections for citizens 
found in AP I, article 51(3).  However, it does not contain the limitation of 
targeting only for the limited time that the civilian is engaged in direct part 
of hostilities. The test is similarly distinguishable from the “continuous com-
bat function” articulated in the INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN 
HOSTILITIES UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 996 (2009) [here-
inafter ICRC DPH Guidance]. 
147 Some scholars argue that the only legitimate targets are those who di-
rectly participate in terrorist activities.  They further assert that the direct 
participants can only be targeted when they are engaged as a combatant.  
Thus, under this thinking the farmer by day and fighter by night can only be 
targeted at night.  See Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Ex-
trajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted Killings, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 19, Addendum (May 28, 2010).  See also ICRC 
DPH Guidance, 66-68.  (This author does not subscribe to this opinion as it 
would unjustly favor the terrorist over the State, with potential cataclysmic 
ramifications to the State).   
148 See supra note 150, at articles 50, 51; see also GC I, article 24.  
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with targeted terrorists.149  Civilian deaths are always a trage-
dy but sometimes unavoidable when a terrorist is targeted.  AQ 
leaders are known to use protected persons (e.g., civilians) and 
places (e.g., religious, charitable or cultural property) as cover 
to avoid attacks.150   
A UAV can potentially discriminate more precisely be-
tween legitimate and protected targets than traditional 
manned aircraft or other weapon systems.   For instance, the 
UAV MQ-9 Reaper can soar at 50,000 feet for 32 hours to sur-
vey an area two-and-a-half miles wide from 12 simultaneous 
angles; this persistence  ensures that an AQ member is target-
ed to minimize the killing of civilians and the destruction of ci-
vilian property.151  An imaging system called ARGUS included 
in some UAVs can detect an item as small as six inches from an 
altitude of 20,000 feet to ensure that an AQ member is properly 
identified.152   
Fatigue is less a concern with UAV than manned aircraft 
given UAV operators can take shifts while the UAV remains 
airborne.  The operator of a UAV does not have to fear being 
shot down while waiting for the opportune time to strike.  
Thus, the UAV controller can focus on ensuring a precise, la-
ser-guided strike on a target.  Finally, a strike from a UAV can 
be pinpoint and produce less collateral damage than an assault 
by a Special Forces team into a hostile area. 
D. Proportionality  
The next consideration in the jus in bello analysis is pro-
portionality, which ensures that the benefits from targeting 
outweigh the damages or collateral effects from the target-
ing.153  There is a balancing test between the military ad-
vantage and the civilian damage/loss of life.154  Thus, it may be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
149 Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case 
Study of Pakistan, 21 (2012). 
150 Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 101, 118 (2011). 
151 JEREMIAH GERTLER, U.S. UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS, R42136, 35 
(2012); see also Grossman, “Drone Home,” supra note 15. 
152 See supra note 15. 
153 Vogel, supra note 150, at 124. 
154 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention, supra note 143, at art. 
51(5)(b); see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, 
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unlawful to strike a bazaar where an AQ leader is shopping if 
numerous civilians may be killed or wounded in the process.  
The question hinges upon a judgment that the civilian deaths 
or property damage is, or is not, excessive in relation to the 
military advantage that would be achieved by the strike.  Sup-
pose the target is an elusive terrorist who rarely presents him-
self in public and has directed numerous terrorist attacks in 
the past.  Therefore, proportionality may not restrict the attack 
given the military advantage to be gained by this target’s 
death.  In the final analysis, leaders must take all precautions 
necessary to minimize the loss of life and property damage if 
available.  
E. Humanity  
The last component of the jus in bello analysis is humani-
ty.  This principle attempts to minimize suffering.155  For in-
stance, it is unlawful to place broken glass in a mortar or gre-
nade which will make it difficult to treat an injured combatant 
since the glass is not detectable by x-ray.156  A commander 
must evaluate if there is a more prudent way to target a per-
son.157  In the context of UAV, there is no need to capture a ter-
rorist if it would expose friendly forces to unnecessary risk or 
suffering, or threaten security arrangements between nations 
by putting American forces on the ground in another State.158  
Moreover, there may be policy reasons that constrain the send-
ing of US forces into a country, with or without the host State’s 
consent.  From a strategic standpoint, one could argue that the 
assault in Abbottabad, Pakistan by Navy SEALs to kill Bin 
Laden caused greater condemnation from the Pakistani gov-
ernment than many UAV strikes in that country.159  This is 
probably the sentiment that “boots on the ground” is a greater 
infringement on a State’s sovereignty than a UAV that flies !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
FIELD MANUAL 27-10 5 (1956). 
155 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land art. 23(e), (Oct. 18, 1907) 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277.   
156 U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10, supra note 161, at § 34.b. 
157 Vogel, supra note 150, at 127-128. 
158 Michael J. Boyle, The Cost and Consequences of Drone Warfare, 89 
INT’L AFFAIRS 12 (2013). 
159 Jane Perlez and David Rohde, Pakistan Pushes Back Against U.S. 
Criticism on Bin Laden, N.Y TIMES, May 3, 2011. 
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thousands of feet above the ground and launches an attack si-
lently from the sky. 
 The armaments found on UAV are lawful weapons.  
However, any lawful weapon has the potential for improper 
use.  Combatants who fire mortars without regard for where 
the projectiles will land have used a lawful weapon in an un-
lawful manner.  This is not to say that every strike by UAV is 
lawful.  There is not a mandate for a State to anticipate all po-
tential wrongful applications of a lawful weapon system since 
all weapons are capable of use in an unlawful manner.160  UAV 
can employ the same missiles as those carried by manned air-
craft.  The UAV MQ-1 Predator is armed with two AGM-114 
Hellfire missiles, while the MQ-9 Reaper carries up to sixteen 
Hellfire missiles.161  The Army’s Apache helicopter carries the 
same number of Hellfire missiles as the Reaper, but nobody 
has suggested that the Apache is an unlawful weapon system. 
162  What makes the UAV unique is its operation by personnel, 
who are at times thousands of miles from the scene of the 
strike.  Regardless of its mysterious nature, the UAV is still a 
lawful weapons system.  
F. Summary Analysis under Jus in Bello 
America’s uses of UAVs pass the necessary criteria of jus 
in bello when the target is evaluated for military necessity, dis-
tinction, proportionality and humanity.  Under military neces-
sity, only military objectives can be targeted.  Terrorists are 
lawful objects to attack.  Identifying these targets is challeng-
ing given AQ members do not wear distinctive insignia or uni-
forms.  Given the ability of UAVs to hover over an area for 
hours at a time and sophisticated imaging systems, they have 
the ability to discriminate between legitimate and protected 
targets.  Like other weapons systems, commanders must per-
form a proportionality analysis that weighs the collateral ef-
fects from targeting terrorists.  The weapons on UAVs are law-
ful weapon system, and are the same as used on piloted !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
160 Laurie R. Blank, After “Top Gun”: How Drone Strikes Impact the Law 
of War, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 687  (2012). 
161 Gertler, supra note 156, at 35.   
162 Id.   
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aircraft.  In the final analysis, a UAV is a lawful weapon sys-
tem, as long as UAVs are utilized with a focus on minimizing 
human suffering.  
IV. TARGETING UNDER DOMESTIC LAW  
A. The Department of Justice White Paper  
Any decision to employ force must rest upon the existence 
of a legal basis in international law from the dual perspectives 
of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.163 Another prerequisite is the 
domestic law of a State.164  The Obama Administration justified 
the targeting of American citizens via UAV in a 2012 memo-
randum published by the Department of Justice titled “Law-
fulness of a Lethal Operation Directed against a U.S. Citizen 
who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or an Associate 
Force.”165 This unclassified, undated White Paper (with no 
listed author) was obtained by the press during the Senate con-
firmation hearings for John Brennan to be Director of the CIA.  
Much of the analysis in the White Paper is applicable to tar-
geted persons irrespective of US citizenship.   
 The sixteen-page memo details the elements that the 
Obama Administration deems necessary prior to the targeting 
of a U.S. citizen.166 First, the targeted individual must present 
an imminent threat of violent attack against the U.S.167 Se-
cond, the U.S. citizen must have joined AQ or its associated 
forces and is a senior operational leader.168  Third, capture 
must be infeasible.169 Lastly, the operation , must be conducted 
in accordance with the previously discussed LOAC (and its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
163 Richard DiMeglio, supra note 94, at 8.   
164 Larson, supra note 82, at 2. 
165 “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed against a U.S. Citizen 
who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or an Associate Force,” [here-
inafter White Paper]. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/ 
020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf (accessed 4/10/13).  There appears to be a 
classified version of the White Paper that was not publicly released but was 
shown to members of two Congressional Committees; see O’Connell, supra 
note 26. 
166 Id. 
167 White Paper, at 1. 
168 Id. at 2. 
169 Id. at 6. 
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components of necessity, distinction, proportionality and hu-
manity).170  The legal determinations are not new; they closely 
reflect those given by Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. in a 
speech he gave at Northwestern University School of Law on 
March 5, 2012.171  Let us examine five assertions within the 
White Paper: 1) Authorization for Use of Military Force; 2) As-
sociated Forces as Targets; 3) Imminence of the Threat; 4) Cap-
ture of Suspect Infeasible; and 5) No Mandatory Judicial Re-
view.172  
B. Authorization for the Use of Military Force  
The White Paper’s primary argument for justification of 
targeting a U.S. citizen, who has joined AQ or its associated 
forces, is the President’s alleged constitutional responsibility to 
protect the U.S. and its citizens.173  The document also bases 
the right to target U.S. citizens who are senior leaders of AQ 
under the self-defense justification in both CIL and Article 51 
of the U.N. Charter. The White Paper further cites Public Law 
107-40, Authorization For Use of Military Force in Response to 
the 9/11 Attacks, (AUMF).174  This legislation authorizes the 
President to use military force against only those international 
terrorists and other parties directly involved in aiding or mate-
rially supporting the 9-11 attacks.175  The relevant portion of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
170 Id. at 1. 
171 Eric Holder, Attorney General of the United States, Speech to 
Northwestern University School of Law, (March 5, 2012) available at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech- 
1203051.html. 
172 White Paper. 
173 Although no specific responsibility is prescribed in the Constitution, it 
is believed the author meant that this “responsibility” is derived by analogy 
from the President being the commander in chief of the Army and Navy and 
his responsibility to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the 
US.” See generally U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1-2; President Obama also references 
this responsibility in the National Strategy for Counterterrorism: “The most 
solemn responsibility of the President and the United States Government is 
to protect the American people, both at home and abroad…” Barak Obama, 
President of the U.S., National Strategy for Counterterrorism 1, 8 (June 28, 
2011). 
174 AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE, PL 107–40, 
September 18, 2001, 115 Stat 224. [hereinafter AUMF]. 
175 The AUMF satisfied the authorization required under the War Pow-
ers Act. See AUMF at §2(b)(1). 
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the law reads: 
 
SECTION 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED 
STATES ARMED FORCES. 
(a) IN GENERAL. — That the President is authorized to use all 
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organiza-
tions, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, 
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to pre-
vent any future acts of international terrorism against the Unit-
ed States by such nations, organizations or persons.176  
C. Associated Forces  
Note that the AUMF only gives the President authoriza-
tion to take military action against those nations, organizations 
or persons he has determined to have planned, authorized, 
committed or aided the 9-11 terrorist attacks. Congress did not 
give the President a blanket authorization to use force against 
all terrorist organizations.177  It is clear that AQ and the Tali-
ban fall under the authorized entities encompassed by the 
AUMF based on AQ’s planning and execution of the 9-11 at-
tacks and the Taliban’s harboring of AQ.  This Congressional 
authorization is far-reaching as applied to AQ and the Taliban.  
It not only authorizes targeting members of AQ and the Tali-
ban who had a part in the 9-11 attacks, but members who 
played no part in the attacks, and also converts who became a 
part of AQ or the Taliban after 9-11.178  The White Paper also 
asserts the ability to target both AQ and its associated forces.179   
 These associated forces can be targeted under the au-
thority of the AUMF if they have a direct connection to AQ.180 
The associated forces with connections to AQ may be dwindling 
after twelve years of war.  AQ was a vertical organization with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
176 AUMF, supra note 174. 
  177 Richard F. Grimmett, Cong. Research Serv., RL22357, Authorization 
For Use Of Military Force in 
Response to the 9/11 Attacks (P.L. 107-40): Legislative History 3 (2007). 
178 Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authoriza-
tion and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005)   
179 White Paper, at 1. 
180 Richard DiMeglio, supra note 177, at 3.   
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a central command structure at the time of 9-11.181 Since then, 
AQ has been described by John Rollins, specialist in Terrorism 
and National Security for the Congressional Research Service, 
as: 
… composed mostly of a core cadre of veterans of the Afghan in-
surgency against the Soviet Union, with a centralized leadership 
structure made up mostly of Egyptians. Most of the organiza-
tion’s plots either emanated from the top or were approved by the 
leadership. Some analysts describe pre-9/11 Al Qaeda as akin to 
a corporation, with Osama Bin Laden acting as an agile Chief 
Executive Officer issuing orders and soliciting ideas from subor-
dinates.  Some would argue that the Al Qaeda of that period no 
longer exists. Out of necessity, due to pressures from the security 
community, in the ensuing years it has transformed into a diffuse 
global network and philosophical movement composed of dis-
persed nodes with varying degrees of independence.182 
 
Thus, AQ is more fractured and decentralized today than 
at any time since the 9-11 attacks.  This puts a greater burden 
on the present Administration to ensure the targeted person is 
a member of an organization actually connected to AQ.  Anoth-
er noteworthy point in the AUMF is that there is no expiration 
date for the authorization for the use of force. However, Con-
gress could pass a law that revokes this authority at any time.  
Finally, there is no restriction as to the geographic confines of 
the authorization: the strike does not necessarily need to occur 
in a declared combat zone. 
D. Imminence of the Threat  
The White Paper sets as a condition that the targeted indi-
vidual must constitute an imminent threat of a violent attack 
against the U.S.183 The paper promulgates a unique definition 
of “imminent” that “does not require clear evidence of a specific 
attack on US persons and interests in the immediate future.”184  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
181 John Rollins, Cong. Research Serv., RS41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: 
Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy 
(Jan. 25, 2011). 
182 Id. 
183 White Paper, at 1. 
184 Id. at 7. 
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Thus, imminence is inferred as long as the targeted U.S. citizen 
has recently been involved in activities posing a threat of vio-
lent attack, and there is no evidence suggesting that the person 
has renounced or abandoned such activities.  From the author 
of the White Paper’s perspective, senior leaders of AQ are con-
tinually planning attacks and prior activity implies intent for 
future attacks.185 Thus, imminence is always present or contin-
uous as long as there is no renunciation from the targeted per-
son.   
Critics argue that the memo “redefines the word immi-
nence in a way that deprives the word of its ordinary mean-
ing.”186  It is unclear why the administration put this stipula-
tion into the White Paper, since there is no requirement under 
jus in bello that a lawful target be an imminent threat.  It is 
possible that it was included to reinforce the grounds for the 
strike in the first place: self-defense generally and anticipatory 
self-defense more specifically. Recall that anticipatory self-
defense justifies using force in anticipation of an “imminent” 
armed attack.187  
E. Capture of the Terrorist Infeasible  
The White Paper determines that capture is infeasible 
when the attempt would pose an undue risk to U.S. personnel 
involved in an operation or if the host State did not consent to 
the capture within their borders.188  If capture is not feasible, 
then the U.S. citizen could be targeted by UAV.  There may be 
policy or strategic considerations to capture a member of AQ or 
its associated forces instead of targeting them; however, under 
CIL there is no requirement to capture the target if it would 
threaten the lives of friendly forces.189 The only requirement 
under the humanity analysis of jus in bello is to reduce the de-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
185 Id. at 8. 
186 Jameel Jaffer, “The Justice Department’s White Paper on Targeted 
Killing,” ACLU Blog of Rights, February 4, 2013, http://www.aclu.org/blog/ 
national-security/justice-departments-white-paper-targeted-killing (last vis-
ited Feb. 12, 2014). 
187 Murphy, supra note 117, at 3. 
188 White Paper, at 8. 
189 Keck, supra note 141, at 171-172.   
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gree of suffering caused by a particular weapon system.190 
F. Judicial Review Not Required  
The White Paper argues that judicial oversight is not re-
quired and is in fact inappropriate regarding the targeting of a 
U.S. citizen.191  The administration argues that it is well estab-
lished that matters relating to foreign policy or national securi-
ty are not the province of the courts, since they involve matters 
of discretion assigned by the Constitution to the executive 
branch.192  This may be technically accurate; however, the ab-
sence of a legal requirement in our current system does not 
make such targeting a correct policy decision. 
Congress could create an appropriate judicial forum to re-
view the justification for targeting a U.S. citizen and rule on 
this action.  While perhaps not legally required, it is logical un-
der basic due process for certain checks on executive branch 
power to be in place prior to the taking of a U.S. citizen’s life.  
The American legal system gives more rights to a U.S. citizen 
prior to police searching his or her home than when they are 
marked for a drone strike; the former action requires a court-
issued search warrant.193 
The present Administration should introduce legislation to 
Congress that would create a special court to review the analy-
sis and evidence from the executive branch that indicates a 
U.S. citizen meets all criteria under domestic and international 
law prior to targeting.194  This special court would be empow-
ered to authorize or decline the government’s request for that 
U.S. citizen to be added to the targeted list.  If time would not 
permit bringing the evidence before the court, the legislation 
must include other safeguards such as post-targeting reporting 
to the court and/or select committees or subcommittees of Con-
gress.  A similar reporting system to Congress should be in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
190 See supra note 143. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention at 
article 51(5)(b). 
191 White Paper at 10. 
192 Id. 
193 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
194 Editorial Comment, A Court for Targeted Killings, N.Y. Times (Feb. 
13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/opinion/a-special-court-is- 
needed-to-review-targeted-killings.html.   
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place for targeted AQ members who are not U.S. citizens.  
Without such legal protections, the United States government 
will continue to be accused of violating LOAC and infringing on 
the sovereignty of other States.     
G. Summary Analysis of Targeting under Domestic Law  
In sum, the AUMF empowers the executive branch to take 
military action against AQ and the Taliban.  The White Paper 
cites the authority from the AUMF, amongst other claimed au-
thorities.  In addition, the White Paper claims authority to not 
only target AQ and Taliban senior leaders, but also members of 
its “associated forces.”  As a condition for targeting, the White 
Paper notes the target must constitute an imminent threat of a 
violent attack against the US.  The author of the White Paper 
takes a broad definition of  “imminence” in regards to the 
threat to the U.S., indicating that imminence is inferred as 
long as the targeted person has recently been involved in activ-
ities posing a threat of violent attack, without any evidence of 
renunciation.  The White Paper also determines that capture is 
infeasible if the attempt would pose an undue risk to U.S. 
troops involved in an operation or if the host State did not con-
sent to the capture within its borders.  Finally, the White Pa-
per argues that judicial oversight of UAV targeting is not re-
quired since it is a matter of foreign policy or national security, 
which is reserved to the executive branch.  
V. CONCLUSION  
Administrations since 9-11 have wielded power in the form 
of unmanned aircraft flying thousands of feet above their tar-
gets.  The concept of lethality without exposing a pilot to harm 
was attempted virtually from the advent of flight.  During 
OEF, those capabilities were realized and honed to find and 
target Taliban, AQ and associated fighters in Somalia, Yemen, 
Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan.  This paper has argued that, 
within certain parameters, the U.S. can legitimately target ter-
rorists under the AUMF outside a combat zone as long as the 
government conducts proper analysis prior to such targeting.  
This use of force is permitted in self-defense under both cus-
tomary international law and the United Nations Charter.  
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The UAV targeting has reduced the ranks of leadership 
and the decentralization of AQ and its affiliates.  “Eliminating 
AQ’s leadership is an effective way of disrupting its command 
and control and reducing its operational capabilities, but these 
killings will not end AQ’s terrorist crusade” unless they are 
properly integrated into the U.S. National Counterterrorism 
Strategy.195  In fact, secondary effects from targeting (civilian 
deaths) increase the size of the recruiting pool for AQ.  These 
consequences can perpetuate the very conflict the UAV pro-
gram seeks to eliminate. 
This is not to say that the UAV program does not have its 
place as a permissible weapon system in the commander’s ar-
senal.  There is a time and place for UAV targeting, especially 
in the “shadowy and secretive world of transnational terror-
ism.”196  The judicious use of this weapon alongside other ele-
ments of national power will comprehensively combat AQ and 
its ruthless ideology. 
When President Obama was elected in 2008, he wanted to 
restore the United States’ reputation in the international com-
munity as a good neighbor following the failure of American 
forces to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the con-
troversial interrogation practices that followed the invasions of 
Iraq and Afghanistan.197  His administration’s current practice 
of targeted killings using UAVs potentially damages that resto-
ration campaign. A clearly articulated process with appropriate 
checks and balances is essential for domestic support at home 
and tolerated acceptance abroad of the UAV program.  An ap-
propriate judicial forum to review and approve targeted kill-
ings of U.S. citizens abroad will assist in adding transparency 
and legitimacy to a criticized secret program.  Additionally, 
disclosures to Congress concerning non-citizens will ensure !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
195 Jenkins, supra note 28, at 15. 
196 Per Professor Schmitt, “In the shadowy and secretive world of trans-
national terrorism, that window can close long before a terrorist strike takes 
place.  Stated bluntly, when the opportunity presents itself, it may be neces-
sary, and lawful, to kill a terrorist that you cannot capture, even though you 
do not know precisely when and where he or she will strike.” Schmitt, supra 
note 112, at 66. 
197 Barack H. Obama, Democratic National Convention Acceptance 
Speech, Aug. 28, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/28/ 
us/politics/28text-obama.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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that the administration is conducting the proper legal analysis 
before targeting a suspected terrorist. 
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